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Abstract
This thesis presents a study of political opposition in the decade leading to the end of President
Suharto's New Order regime in Indonesia. In particular it focuses on the contribution of
opposition forces to the process of political democratisation and the interplay in that process
between societal/opposition initiative and disunity within the governing elite.
Following the literature on authoritarian regimes, the study proposes a typology of opposition:
illegal, semi‚ alegal and proto-opposition. Each of these are responses to the combination of
repression and pluralism typical of authoritarianism. Although a mood of discontent was
apparently ubiquitous in the later years of Suharto's rule, opposition remained dispersed
through a wide range of institutions and was structurally weak. Much of it was located along
the blurred boundary between state and society.
The study focuses on the period of limited liberalisation (keterbukaan, 'openness') between
approximately 1989 and 1994. Following the mainstream democratisation literature, the thesis
concludes that conflict within the governing elite (in this case between a substantial section of
the Armed Forces leadership and the President and his camp) was an important pre-condition
for the limited loosening of political controls from 1989. From the outset, however, societal
agency played an important role in conditioning the emergence of nascent 'soft-line' reform
groups within the regime.
In a series of case studies (elite dissident groups, Non-Governmental Organisations, student
dissent and the Indonesian Democracy Party, PDI) I examine the methods by which opposition
groups responded to divisions within the governing elite and made use of the opportunities thus
afforded them to expand the scope of political action. In a process typical of authoritarian
regimes which initiate liberalisation, in the years after 1989 an escalation of opposition
mobilisation took place.
However, by the mid-1990s, President Suharto was able to reassert control over the ruling elite,
especially the army, facilitating a retreat from liberalisation policies. Increasing 'sultanisation'
of the regime undermined its legitimacy and precluded a resolution of its political problems,
especially the succession issue, from within the ruling elite. After the economic collapse of
1997-98, in a 'sequence of disaffection' typical of regimes where the hard-line element is strong,
a society-initiated process of regime change began. Mobilisation, pioneered by the most
politicised groups (notably university students), propelled other social and political forces into
action, and stimulated the final fracturing of the ruling elite and the abandonment of Suharto by
a substantial part of it. The legacy of authoritarian rule, however, meant that opposition
remained structurally weak and divided, allowing for the replacement of Suharto's government
by a reconstituted version of it.
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Preface
In Pancasila Democracy there is no place for Western style opposition (oposisi
ala Barat). In the world of Pancasila democracy we have deliberation
(musyawarah) to achieve consensus (mufakat) of the people. The method we
use is that the people put their trust in their representatives. Then, the people's
representatives engage in musyawarah. Then we achieve mufakat to determine
what steps we shall take together for the next five years . . . Here we do not
have opposition like that in the West. Opposition for the sake of opposing, for
the sake of being different, is unknown here.1
This statement, from Suharto's 1989 autobiography, typified the view of his New Order
government toward political opposition. The authoritarian 'Pancasila ideology' expounded by
the government’s leaders extolled 'traditional' and 'authentic' Indonesian values of mutual
assistance (gotong royong), deliberation (musyawarah) and consensus (mufakat), insisting on
the subordination of group and individual interests to the societal good and the fundamental
unity of state and society ('the organic state').2 Groups and individuals which challenged the
government were routinely portrayed as selfishly placing their own narrow interests before
those of society and as thus forfeiting their rights to participate in the consensual life of the
body politic. An all-pervasive, but often brutally effective, coercive apparatus was always ready
to be deployed against them. Even leaders of the permitted political parties routinely denied
that their parties were ‘oppositions’. Attempts by liberal intellectuals, notably Muslim scholar
Nurcholish Madjid, to advocate a 'loyal opposition' within the New Order framework were
routinely rejected out of hand by government spokespeople.3
And yet, opposition was apparently ubiquitous in New Order Indonesia. I was struck by this
during my first Ph.D. field trip to Jakarta in early 1993. On informing a new acquaintance that
my research topic was 'opposition', he replied: ‘Who do you mean by the opposition? These
days, everybody in Indonesia is in the opposition.’ At the height of keterbukaan (openness) it
seemed that he was right. Almost every day there were reports of protests by students, workers,
or Islamic youth. Newspapers were full of reports quoting academics, party politicians and
retired officials making sometimes fundamental criticisms of the regime (indeed, newspaper
reports often did not even bother to report any particular event, but were simply cobbled-
together collections of the views of noted critics on this or that issue). Neighbours, taxi drivers
and other casual acquaintances were very willing to complain about topics like the President's
                                                     
1 Dwipayana and Ramadhan, 1989, p. 346.
2 Pancasila, the Indonesian ‘national ideology’ is a brief statement of ideals, incorporating belief in one
God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy through consultation and consensus, and social justice.
On Pancasila ideology see Morfit, 1981; Reeve, 1985; Bourchier, 1992, 1996 & 1997; Simanjuntak,
1994b; Ramage, 1995.
iv
children or the many low level abuses they experienced. During my months in the capital I
attended a seemingly endless series of functions on the Jakarta seminar circuit, where topics
like democratisation, openness and the like were dissected in minute detail. And yet, the mood
was almost universally pessimistic. Most of my informants were reluctant to believe that
anything more than the most cosmetic reform would occur in the foreseeable future.4
Initially, my research project began as a detailed historical study of Indonesia’s democratic
opposition. I aimed to trace the origins of various groups and key individuals back before the
foundation of the New Order, in order to analyse their changing responses to the consolidation
and ossification of the regime over subsequent decades. In this way, I hoped to account for the
combination of diffuse oppositional sentiment and structural ineffectiveness. However, the
rapid pace (to put it lightly) of political developments during my Ph.D. candidature (1992-
1999) kept drawing my attention to contemporary developments. I ended up discarding much of
this early research and focusing on the keterbukaan period, which began in 1989 and ended
between 1994 and 1996.
During those years, as tension about Presidential succession mounted, an atmosphere of
increased political uncertainty developed. Many kinds of political actors strove to adjust by
finding new constituencies, formulating political strategies, making new alliances, pressing for
political change or jockeying for position in anticipation of it. Gradually, political opposition
became more overt, prompting the government to take action to rein in keterbukaan, moving
first against sections of the press, then Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI (Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia) and other groups.
Although I concluded most of my fieldwork in late 1995, the pace of political change in
Indonesia continued to accelerate. Accordingly, I decided to add chapters incorporating the
major crackdown on opposition in 1996 and the wave of protest which culminated with
President Suharto’s resignation in May 1998, although these later chapters are not as detailed as
those which precede them.5
                                                                                                                                                          
3 See for example Madjid, 1994.
4 Juan Linz (1973, p. 173-4) made similar comments on Franco's Spain in the late 1960s, noting that a
foreign visitor would sometimes ‘have the impression that almost everyone is opposed to the regime or at
least holds opinions that seem incompatible with its avowed ideology...’
5 It should be noted at the outset, too, that the collapse of the Suharto regime confronted me with an
important methodological problem. Most of my information was collected as the events discussed in
chapters four to seven unfolded. It is likely that had I the opportunity to re-visit all my informants after
Suharto’s fall, that their recollections and reconstructions of events, their tactics and choices, would be
quite different from those relayed to me earlier. In addition, I would presumably not have to rely to the
same extent on confidential sources. Time and other constraints made this impossible, but it is important
for the reader to bear this limitation in mind while reading following chapters.
vI bring my study to an end at this point. Suharto’s fall proved to be a decisive democratic
breakthrough. Under the (as it turned out) transitional Habibie presidency, a far-reaching
process of liberalisation and democratisation began. The strategic environment which
confronted societal actors was utterly transformed.
In the study I focus on two main sets of questions. These cover, first, the nature and forms of
oppositional politics under the New Order regime. This implies looking at both internal features
of opposition (composition, aims, techniques etc) as well as how the regime distinguished
tolerated and non-tolerated opposition. Second, I focus on the contribution of opposition actors
to democratisation itself. A particular concern, as explained in chapter one, is the influence on
societal opposition of intra-regime disunity and structural changes wrought by economic
development.
The core of my thesis consists of cases studies (chapters four to seven) where I look at ‘elite’
dissident groups, non-governmental organisations, student dissent and the PDI. This choice
does not imply that I found these forms to be ‘most important’, merely that together they
represented a broad cross section of oppositional responses to New Order authoritarianism.
My interest is primarily in ‘democratic’ opposition, although, as we shall see, strategies for
democratisation were inevitably inter-twined with attitudes about social inequality and the
proper place for Islam in the polity. I have limited my selection in other ways. I am primarily
interested in middle class opposition, for reasons which are more fully explained in the next
chapter. I exclude from the study independence movements (most prominently in our period,
those in West Papua, East Timor and Aceh) which sought not merely to reform the
governmental system in the Indonesian nation-state, but to break away from it altogether.
Similarly, I have not devoted a separate chapter to ‘Islamic’ forms of opposition. This was
partly, too, for practical reasons: balanced treatment of Islamic politics in our period would
have required a separate thesis-length study. In part it was because the Suharto government
pursued a policy of rapprochement with political Islam from the late 1980s, which meant that
Islamic opposition was to a large degree co-opted and neutralised during keterbukaan. In any
case, questions about the proper role of Islam infused all opposition debates, and are considered
at length in following chapters. I am aware that some readers may have objections to my
selection, but for reasons of space alone I was obliged to be ruthless.
